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ABSTRACT 
Establishment of pairwise keys between sensor nodes in a sensor network is a difficult problem due to 
resource limitations of sensor nodes as well as vulnerability to physical captures of sensor nodes by the 
enemy. Public-key cryptosystems are not much suited for most resource-constrained sensor networks. 
Recently, elliptic curve cryptographic techniques show that public key cryptosystem is also feasible for 
resource-constrained sensor networks. However, most researchers accept that the symmetric key 
cryptosystems are viable options for resource-constrained sensor networks. In this paper, we first develop 
a basic principle to address the key pre-distribution problem in mobile sensor networks. Then, using this 
developed basic principle, we propose a scheme which takes the advantage of the post-deployment 
knowledge. Our scheme is a modified version of the key prioritization technique proposed by Liu and 
Ning. Our improved scheme provides reasonable network connectivity and security. Moreover, the 
proposed scheme works for any deployment topology. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Security, Key establishment, Mobile sensor networks, Key prioritization, Post-deployment knowledge. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Micro Electro-mechanical Systems (MEMS) technology [25] has developed the sensor nodes 
which are smaller in size, more battery-powered and less production costs. By reducing the size 
of a sensor node, it is easy to deploy across a target field (i.e., deployment area). The first 
application of sensor networks was the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) [21] which had 
been used during the cold war in the early 1950s for the purposes to detect as well as track 
Soviet submarines with the help of acoustic sensors or hydrophones. Due to breakthrough of the 
MEMS technology, more civilian applications have been observed. There are several 
applications of sensor networks, for examples, environmental monitoring, classroom/home [9, 
24], health monitoring of patients [23], habitat monitoring [3, 18], etc. 
 
In a sensor network, there are many tiny nodes called the sensors, which are deployed for the 
purposes to sense data and then to transmit the data to the nearby base station. Sensor networks 
are mainly classified into two categories: distributed and hierarchical. In a hierarchical wireless 
sensor network (HWSN) shown in Figure 1, there is a hierarchy among the nodes based on their 
capabilities: base stations, cluster heads and sensor nodes. Sensor nodes are inexpensive, limited 
capability and generic wireless devices. Each sensor has limited battery power, memory size 
and data processing capability and short radio transmission range. Sensor nodes in a cluster 
(also called a group), communicate each other in that cluster and finally communicate with the 
cluster head (CH). Usually, Cluster heads have more resources than sensors, which are 
equipped with high power batteries, large memory storages, powerful antenna and data 
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processing capabilities. Cluster heads can execute relatively complicated numerical operations 
than sensors and have much larger radio transmission range than sensor nodes. Cluster heads 
can communicate among each other directly and relay data between its cluster members and the 
base station. A base station/sink node (BS) is typically a gateway to another network or an 
access point for human interface. A base station collects sensor readings, perform costly 
operations on behalf of sensor nodes and manage the network. In some applications, the base 
station is assumed to be trusted. Thus, the base station is used as key distribution center (KDC). 
 
 
Figure 1: A hierarchical wireless sensor network (HWSN) architecture. 
 
On the other hand, in a distributed wireless sensor network (DWSN) shown in Figure 2, there is 
no fixed infrastructure and network topology is not known prior to deployment of the sensor 
nodes in the target field. Sensor nodes are usually deployed all over the target area randomly. 
After deployment, sensor nodes form an infrastructure-less multi-hop wireless communications 
between them and data is routed back to the base station. Data flow in DWSN is similar to data 
flow in HWSN with a difference that network-wise (broadcast) flow takes place by every sensor 
node in the network. In this paper, we consider the distributed sensor networks for developing 
key establishment scheme. 
 
 
Figure 2: A distributed wireless sensor network (DWSN) architecture. 
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The topology of the network is in general dynamic, because the connectivity among the sensor 
nodes may vary with time due to the factors such as new node addition, node departures, and the 
possibility of having mobile nodes. In our case, we assume that nodes are mobile and so the 
network topology is dynamic. 
 
Pairwise key establishment between neighboring sensor nodes in a sensor network is done by 
using a protocol which is popularly known as the bootstrapping protocol. A bootstrapping 
protocol usually involves three phases. In key pre-distribution phase, each sensor node is 
initialized by a set of pre-distributed keys in its memory, called the key ring. This is done before 
deployment of the sensor nodes by the key setup server (the base station) in a target field. After 
deployment, a direct key establishment (also called the shared key discovery) phase is 
performed by sensor nodes in order to establish direct pairwise keys between them. The path 
key establishment phase is executed if two neighbor nodes fail to establish a direct key after the 
direct key establishment phase. Suppose that two neighbors u  and v  fail to establish a direct 
secure link between them in the direct key establishment phase, but there exists a path, say 
〉==〈
−
vuuuuu hh ,,,, 110 K  in the network with each iu  being a direct neighbor of 1+iu for 
1,,1,0 −= hi K . u generates a random key k , encrypts k  with the key shared between 
0uu =  and 1u  and transmits this encrypted key to 1u . 1u  then retrieves k  by decrypting the 
encrypted key using the shared key between u  and 1u , encrypts k  by the key shared by 1u  and 
2u  and transmits it to 2u . This process is continued until the key k  reaches to the desired 
destination v . Now u  and v  can communicate secretly and directly using k . The main 
difficulty in this process is the discovery of a secure path between u  and v . The 
communication overhead increases significantly with the number h  of hops. Some 
improvements over the path key establishment phase have been proposed in [26], [27]. 
 
A location-adaptive scheme is based on the random deployment models i.e., it does not use any 
prior knowledge of the deployment locations. Thus, such a scheme has the ability to adjust in 
any deployment areas. On the other hand, a location-aware scheme depends on the prior 
knowledge of the deployment locations like the expected location of each sensor and the overall 
geometry of the deployment area. This pre-deployment knowledge helps us to tune the key pre-
distribution algorithms to achieve better network connectivity and higher resilience against node 
capture. Several techniques [8], [4], [13], [20], [6], [2], [14], [5] are proposed in the literature. 
All these techniques address only for the static sensor networks. Each and every time when a 
sensor node moves, it needs to perform the bootstrapping procedure in order to establish direct 
pairwise keys in that new location. In fact, we must avoid path key establishment phase of the 
bootstrapping procedure for the mobile sensor networks because it involves much more 
communication and computational overheads. In this paper, we focus on the issues of the key 
pre-distributions in mobile sensor networks. We first develop a basic principle for addressing 
the key pre-distribution problem in mobile sensor networks and finally propose a scheme for 
mobile sensor networks. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some issues in the mobile 
sensor networks. In Section 3, we describe briefly the overview of the key prioritization 
technique using the post-deployment knowledge proposed by Liu and Ning [15]. In Section 4, a 
basic principle has been proposed to address the key pre-distribution problem in mobile sensor 
networks. Then, in Section 5, we propose a scheme which follows the basic principle and is 
based on the modified version of the key prioritization technique. In Section 6, we provide the 
analysis of our proposed scheme.  We provide simulation results of our improved scheme in 
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
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2. ISSUES IN  MOBILE SENSOR NETWORKS  
To design a key pre-distribution scheme in mobile sensor networks, we may consider the 
following issues.  
 
The first issue is that we should not assume any prior knowledge of sensors’ locations. 
However, we can assume the post-deployment knowledge of sensors’ locations. This 
assumption becomes practical due to the following researches. Akyildiz et al. [1] pointed out 
that “most of the sensing tasks require knowledge of positions” and also “location finding 
systems are required by many of the proposed sensor network routing protocols”. There are 
several recent advances in determining individual sensor nodes’ positions either with a global 
positioning system (GPS) or local references [12, 19]. Sastry et al. [22], Lazos et al. [11], Du et 
al. [7] and Liu et al. [16, 17] describe the methods of determining secure locations. Thus, in a 
mobile sensor network, it is a possible task for sensor nodes to determine their deployment 
locations securely after deployment. Hence, we can use advantage of post-deployment 
knowledge in mobile sensor networks. 
 
The second issue is to use extra memory for applications to store an excessive amount of pre-
distributed keys as well as the direct pairwise keys between neighbor sensors. Crossbow 
Technology Inc. [10] develops a typical MICA2 mote sensor device which has 512 EEPROM, 
but only 4KB RAM. Thus, it is practical to store more pre-distributed keying information in a 
sensor device. 
 
3. KEY PRIORITIZATION TECHNIQUE USING POST-DEPLOYMENT 
KNOWLEDGE  
We describe briefly the concept of the key prioritization technique proposed by Liu and Ning 
[15]. Their scheme takes the advantage of the post-deployment knowledge of sensor nodes to 
improve the pairwise key pre-distribution in static sensor networks. 
 
This scheme assigns each sensor node an excessive amount of pre-distributed keys in key pre-
distribution phase by using the memory for sensing applications. Then, depending on the post-
deployment knowledge, it prioritizes the pre-distributed keys in key prioritization phase, and 
discard the low priority keys in order to thwart against node capture attack. Since the low 
priority keys are deleted from the memory, so the returned memory is used for the application 
part. 
 
In direct key establishment (i.e., shared key discovery) phase, two neighbor nodes establish a 
pairwise key by exchanging the IDs of the higher priority keys. Liu and Ning then applied it to 
the polynomial pool-based scheme [13] and its analysis shows that it significantly improves the 
security and performance than the previous key pre-distribution schemes. 
 
4. OUR BASIC  PRINCIPLE  
In this section, we now introduce a basic principle for key pre-distribution problem in a mobile 
sensor network. 
Let us assume that the deployment area (i.e., the target field) is two-dimensional so that each 
point in that region can be expressed by two co-ordinates x  and y .  Assume that there are 
n sensor nodes in a sensor network and each node can hold at most m symmetric cryptographic 
keys in its memory. Let K  be a key pool of size M consisting of key units such that each key 
unit has a randomly generated key material and a unique location of the deployment field 
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associated with this key material.  In other words,  ),(|)),(,({ iiiiii yxyxkkuK == is a 
unique location in the deployment field associated with the key material }ik , where iku is 
called a key unit in K . A key material in the basic probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme 
(the EG scheme) [8], the q-composite scheme [4], or the random pairwise keys scheme [4] is 
simply a pre-distributed key. In the polynomial pool-based scheme [13], a key material is a t-
degree symmetric bivariate polynomial from which a sensor node can compute keys shared with 
its neighbors, whereas in the pairwise key pre-distribution scheme [5], a key material is a row of 
the secret matrix iA  in a key space iS .  
 
We use the following two functions for developing the basic principle as follows: 
 
• )(⋅F function takes the inputs as (i) n , the number of nodes in the network, (ii) C , a 
set of predefined constraints, and (iii) K , the key pool. It produces the output as  iKR , 
the sets of  m  key units called the key rings for the nodes  ),,2,1( niui K= . Thus, a 
key ring iKR  of a sensor node iu  is  =iKR ),(,{( iii yxk }1| mi ≤≤ .The (key) setup 
server generates key rings each of size m  for all the sensor nodes to be deployed using 
the )(⋅F function. The function )(⋅F is programmed into the key setup server. 
• )(⋅G  function is useful when two neighbors wish to establish a direct pairwise key 
between them during direct key establishment phase. It takes the inputs as (i) identifiers 
of nodes, (ii) two public addresses, and (iii) the key ring of a sensor node. Then it 
produces a secret shared pairwise key between two neighbors. For example, let u  and 
v  be two neighbors having the public addresses ),( yxu uuPA =  and ),( yxv vvPA =  
respectively, where ),( yx uu and ),( yx vv be the locations in the deployment area. Let 
uID  and vID  represent the identifiers of nodes u  and v , respectively. Then u  uses 
the )(⋅G function to compute the secret shared key between u  and v  as 
),,,,(
, uvuvuvu KRPAPAIDIDGk = . Similarly, v  also uses the same function to 
compute the secret shared key between u  and v  as  
(
,
Gk uv = ,, vu IDID ),, vvu KRPAPA . Now, if the )(⋅G function is symmetric one-way 
function then we have, uvvu kk ,, = . In this case, nodes u  and v  need only to exchange 
their own identifiers and public addresses in order to compute the secret shared key 
between them. The function )(⋅G  is programmed into each sensor device. 
 
The following basic principle can be applied in mobile sensor networks. This protocol is only 
based on the post-deployment knowledge and does not assume any pre-deployment knowledge. 
Our basic protocol consists of the following steps: 
 
• Step 1. After deployment of sensor nodes, the sensor nodes may move from one 
location to another location in the target field. In the new location, the sensor nodes 
determine their post-deployment locations. Let u  and v  be two physical neighbors 
want to establish a secret pairwise key. 
• Step 2. u  determines the post-deployment location which is ),( yxu uuPA = .  u sends 
its identifier uID and uPA  to its neighbor node v . 
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• Step 3. v also determines its post-deployment location ),( yxv vvPA = . Then, v  sends 
its own identifier vID  and this public address vPA  to u . 
• Step 4. u  computes ),,,,(
, uvuvuvu KRPAPAIDIDGk =  as the secret shared key 
between u  and v  using the function )(⋅G . 
• Step 5. u  generates a short puzzle message, say, P  and sends the message 
))(,(
,
PEP
vuk
 to v , where E  is a symmetric-key encryption function. 
• Step 6. v  computes the key ),,,,(
, vvuvuuv KRPAPAIDIDGk = and decrypts the 
encrypted puzzle )(
,
PE
uvk using the key uvk , . If decryption is successful, that is, if the 
decrypted puzzle matches with the incoming puzzle, nodes u  and v  use the secret key 
)(
,, uvvu kk = for their future secret communication. 
 
5. THE IMPROVED SCHEME   
In this section, we propose a key establishment scheme for mobile sensor networks which works 
for any deployment topology. It follows our basic principle described in Section 4. To achieve 
this, we use the modified version of the key prioritization technique proposed by Liu and Ning 
described in Section 3. Thus, our improved scheme is a modified version of the key 
prioritization technique applied over the basic probabilistic scheme (also known as the EG 
scheme) [8]. 
 
Let d be the average number of the neighbor nodes that each sensor node can contact. Assume 
that each sensor node will be given a maximum of m  pre-distributed keying information in its 
memory. Each keying information called a key unit, which consists of a symmetric key and a 
unique location of the deployment area associated with it. As pointed out in Section 2, since we 
can use memory from application in order to store an excessive amount of keying materials, so 
we can use memory for storing dm +  keying information in each sensor device. The low 
priority key units from the per-loaded m key units will not be deleted from the memory even 
after the key prioritization phase. We reserve memory for updating direct keys established 
between a sensor node and its neighbor nodes due to change in the network topology such as the 
mobility of sensor nodes and addition of new sensor nodes. 
 
The different phases of our scheme are as follows. 
 
5.1. Key pre-distribution phase  
In this phase, the key setup server randomly generates a set K  of M  key units, called the key 
pool such that each key unit is a pair )),(,( yxk  where k  is a random number generated by the 
key setup server and ),( yx is a unique deployment location associated with k . The key setup 
server also assigns a unique ID to each sensor node. Let there be n  sensor nodes in the network 
and 
iu
ID  be the identifier of a sensor node ),,2,1( niui K= . For each sensor node iu , the key 
setup server picks a subset of m key units randomly from the key pool K  and then distributes 
this subset to that sensor node before its deployment in the target field. 
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5.2. Key prioritization phase  
Immediately after deployment, the sensor nodes will determine their post-deployment locations. 
Two nodes are called physical neighbors if they are within the communication ranges of one 
another. Let u  and v be two physical neighbors. The public addresses of u  and v  are 
considered as their post-deployment locations, that is, ),( yxu uuPA = and ),( yxv vvPA = . 
Then, each sensor node computes the distances between its post-deployment location and the 
locations associated with the pre-distributed key units. The smaller distance has the higher 
priority. The sensor nodes then choose c  high priority key units and keep the remaining low 
priority key units in its key ring. As a result, the sensor nodes close to each other are more likely 
to have a higher probability to establish a common key. 
 
5.3. Direct key establishment phase  
Two nodes are called key neighbors if they share a common key in their key rings. They are 
called direct neighbors if they are both physical neighbors as well as key neighbors. Now, to 
establish a direct key between two neighbor nodes, they only need to identify a common key 
shared between them. This is achieved by exchanging the locations of c  high priority key units 
between them. Let two nodes u  and v  share )1( ≥q common keys, say, qkkk ,,, 21 K . The 
secret key vuk ,  shared between nodes u  and v  is computed by each other as =vuk ,  
)||||||||)..(||)..(||||( 21 qvuvuvu kkkyPAyPAxPAxPAIDIDh K++ , where )(⋅h is a one-
way hash function (for example, SHA-1), xPAu .  and yPAu . the x-coordinate and y-coordinate 
of the post-deployment location uPA  of a sensor node u , and || the concatenation operation. 
Then nodes can verify their established secret key vuk ,  using the challenge-response protocol 
described in Steps 5 and 6 of Section 4. 
 
5.4. Dynamic node addition phase  
The addition of a new sensor node is simple. The key setup server needs to perform the above 
key pre-distribution phase in order to load m  key units in its memory. The key setup server also 
assigns a unique identifier to that node. After deployment in the field, the key prioritization and 
direct key establishment phases will be performed in order to establish secret keys with the 
neighbor nodes by the newly deployed node. 
 
6.  ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED SCHEME   
In this section, we analyze the network connectivity and security against node capture with 
respect to our improved scheme. 
 
6.1. Probability of establishing direct keys between neighbors  
Assume that u  and v are two neighbor nodes such that their distance is x . Let m  be the key 
ring size of each sensor node, d the average number of nodes that a sensor node can contact, 
and rd  be the communication range of each sensor node. We take rd  as the basic unit of 
measure distance 1=rd . 
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Figure 3: Overlapping area between two neighbor nodes u  and v . 
 
If  A is the size of the deployment field, the maximum number of nodes in the network becomes  
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The (average) number of pre-distributed keys that fall into )(xA  is given by 




×=′
A
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mxN )()( , and 
the total number of keys that are distributed over )(xA  is 




×=′
A
xAMxN )()( , 
where M  is the size of the key pool. Thus, the probability that two neighbor nodes u  and 
v share a key is computed as 
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Hence, the (average) probability of establishing a direct key between two neighbor nodes is 
given by 
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Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the average number of nodes d of a sensor node 
and the maximum supported network size n  for our proposed scheme. It is clear from this 
figure that the maximum supported network size increases as the average number of nodes of a 
sensor node also increases. Moreover, it is also easy to observe that the maximum supported 
network size decreases as the communication range rd increases. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The average number of nodes d  of a sensor node versus the maximum supported 
network size n . Assume that the communication range rd  = 30m, 40m, and the size of the 
deployment field A = 1000m × 1000m. 
 
In order to compute the probability p of establishing a pairwise key between two neighbor 
nodes, we use the following parameters: 
 
• The number of sensor nodes in the sensor network is 18000=n . 
• The size of the deployment field is mmA 10001000 ×= . 
• The communication range is 40=rd m. 
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•  The average number of neighbors of a sensor is 50=d . 
• The key pool size is 100000=M . 
• The number of pre-distributed keys to each sensor node is 200=m . 
• The average number of high priority keys after the key prioritization phase is 200=c . 
 
We have used the Simpson’s 3
1
 rule of integration for an approximate solution of p . The 
direct network connectivity p  is shown in Figure 5. When no additional memory is allocated to 
store pre-distributed keys in the key pre-distribution phase, the probability of sharing a direct 
key between neighbor nodes is around 32.0 . It is clear from this figure that the network 
connectivity increases as the percentage of additional memory also increases. 
 
 
Figure 5: Probability of sharing a direct key between neighbor sensor nodes. Assume 
200,100000 == cM  so that 32.0≈p . 
 
6.2. Resilience against node capture attack  
The resilience against node capture attack of a key distribution scheme is measured by 
estimating the fraction of total secure communications that are compromised by a capture of 
cN nodes not including the communication in which the compromised nodes are directly 
involved. In other words, we want to find out the probability that the adversary can decrypt the 
secret communications between two non-compromised nodes u  and v  when cN  sensor nodes 
are already compromised. 
 
The resilience against node capture of our improved scheme remains same as that of the EG 
scheme [8] and is given by 
,11)(
cN
ce M
mNP 





−−=  
where m  is the key ring size of a node, M  the key pool size, and cN  the number of already 
captured nodes by an attacker. 
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The resilience against node capture attack of our improved scheme is shown in Figure 6. It 
increases as the number of captured nodes also increases. We note that if the sensor nodes are 
compromised before the key prioritization phase, they may reveal more secrets than 
compromising the same set of sensor nodes after the key prioritization phase. Thus, an 
adversary can observe this property and attack the network in the time period between the key 
pre-distribution and the key prioritization phases. This time period is known as the window of 
vulnerability. However, once a sensor node securely determines its post-deployment location 
after its deployment in the target field, it can immediately complete the key prioritization. In 
case of the mobile nodes, the network topology is dynamic and the network connectivity may 
vary at any time. Hence, it is desirable to assume that nodes are not compromised during the 
short period of window of vulnerability. Again, when the topology of the network changes due 
to mobility of sensor nodes, the nodes establish different keys with their neighbors using the 
deployment location of the target field, the high priority keys and the identifiers. Hence, each 
and every time when topology of the network changes, the attacker needs to compute the secret 
keys between non-compromised nodes using the keying information from captured nodes. 
 
 
Figure 6: Probability of compromising a secure link between two non-compromised nodes 
)( ce NP versus the number of captured nodes, cN . Assume 200,200,100000 === cmM  
so that 32.0≈p . 
 
7. SIMULATION RESULTS   
In this section, we have simulated the network connectivity of our improved scheme. For the 
sake of simplicity, we have taken a square target field. We assume that the deployment field is 
two-dimensional, so that every point in the region is expressed by two co-ordinates x and y . A 
point ),( yx in the deployment field is considered as a deployment location for a sensor node. 
Nodes are deployed randomly in the deployment field and due to this, the sensors deployment 
locations are taken as random points in the deployment field. Finally, we take the deployment 
location of each sensor node as the post-deployment location of that node. 
 
We have considered the following parameters for the simulation: 
 
• The number of sensor nodes in the sensor network is 18000=n . 
• The size of the deployment field is mmA 10001000 ×= . 
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• The communication range is 40=rd m. 
•  The average number of neighbors of a sensor is 50=d . 
• The key pool size is 100000=M . 
• The number of pre-distributed keys to each sensor node is 200=m . 
• The average number of high priority keys after the key prioritization phase is 200=c . 
 
The simulation results for network connectivity versus the analytical results for network 
connectivity are shown in Figure 7. It is noted that both results tally closely. When no additional 
memory is allocated to store pre-distributed keys in the key pre-distribution phase, the 
probability of sharing a direct key between neighbor nodes is around 32.0 . The network 
connectivity also increases as the percentage of additional memory increases. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Probability of sharing a direct key between neighbor sensor nodes. Assume 
100000=M and 200=c . 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a basic principle which gives a general framework to address the key pre-
distribution issues in a mobile sensor network. After that, we have proposed a scheme in mobile 
sensor networks which is based on this basic principle and the modified version of the key 
prioritization technique. The improved scheme makes use of post-deployment locations of 
sensor nodes to facilitate the key establishment between neighbor nodes. We have shown that 
our proposed scheme provides reasonable network connectivity as well as resilience against 
node compromise. In future, we would like to further improve the resilience against node 
capture of the proposed scheme. The improved scheme works for any deployment topology and 
also supports the addition of new sensor nodes after initial deployment. 
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